Digital Engineering

Take-aways to follow

Military Engineer (Digital Communications Technician) Technical Update 2024

The Royal Engineer Communication Information System School (RECISS) hosted the annual ME (DCT) Technical Update over the period of 29^th – 31^st May 2024.

War Development (WARDEV). Observations from Ukraine and Gaza reinforce many old lessons, some dating from the Great War. The survivability of CPs, particularly when static, requires full consideration, not only of EW protection measures such as screening, but of concealment from ISTAR and the use of electronic deception.

Electronic Warfare (EW). EW is the battle to control the Electromagnetic Spectrum. It can be likened to Air Superiority and involves electronic Attack (direction finding/triangulation, jamming, spoofing, hacking) Defence (screening, EMCON measures, low level codes), Deception and Interception. The primary purpose of EW is to deny opponents the advantage of C2 and ensure friendly forces unimpeded access to communicate. It can be applied from air, sea, land or even space using uncrewed systems. EW targets communication, radar and other military and civilian assets.

Electronic Protection Measures (EPM). As soon as the adversary has detected an electronic emission, their next step will be to acquire the source of the emission and identify what it is. Electronic warfare detachments will be hunting for high-value targets like command posts. They will also seek to understand our Combat Effectiveness, Order of Battle, Intentions and Locations, most of which can be gleaned by poor communication security.  It is possible to learn a great deal simply from identifying the location or signature of an electronic emission in relation to others and from the type or number of transmissions emanating from it. Use of multiple command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (C4ISR) with their own bespoke radio and antenna systems will allow the adversary to quickly identify a command post location. This can then result in a ‘Spike and Strike’. By setting patterns in our Battle Rhythm (and therefore transmissions), our adversaries can very quickly identify FF locations and strike with indirect fires in a matter of minutes. Without electronic protection measures, such as the following, it will be easier for the adversary to identify the strength and dispositions of our forces:

• Remoting antennas as far away from the command post as possible.
• Using Local Area Subsystems (LAS) and or/Telephone and Line to reduce the number of antennas required and emitting radios.
• Using fluid PACE plans, regularly alternating between different means of communication.
• Digging in subterranean CP’s, or consider the use of mobile CP’s and Rebroadcast Stations to reduce the risk of IDF following a Spike.
• Utilise minimal power of radio sets and minimal elevation of antenna.

HF Renaissance. Amid the evolving EW landscape, NATO and its allies are balancing legacy systems with new technologies.  HF technology offers robustness and reliable communication even under EW threats due to the commonality of it’s signatures and the difficulty in pin pointing where HF transmissions originate from.

Command Post Survivability As soon as the adversary has detected and acquired a potential high-value target by electronic warfare, they will most likely attempt electro-optical/thermal imaging or visual acquisition, probably using unmanned aircraft systems, SIGINT or pattern analysis to identify a target for engagement with long-range fires. In siting command posts, concealment across the electromagnetic spectrum must include mitigation.

• Avoiding forward slopes and sky-lining.
• Using reverse slopes, urban areas or woods and forests to conceal the command post.
• Electronic background ‘hubbub’ in urban areas should allow a command post’s electronic emissions to blend into the background.
• Positioning vehicles in woods or behind treelines to reduce their visual signature.
• Properly applying camouflage netting, or ad hoc screening such as foliage or hessian when camouflage nets are not appropriate, such as in an urban area.
• In siting the command post, consider the background that it will be contrasted against (e.g. an open grass field on a cold night).
• Vehicle/generator exhausts and exhaust pipes must face away from the direction of the threat.
• Properly apply thermal sheeting with separation from the vehicle, not just draped over the vehicle, otherwise the thermal signature will not be concealed.
• Incorporate EMCOM measures to mitigate detection.
• Dig in and muffle generators.

Lesson learned. The following are the lessons learned.

• Employ deception measures, such as dummy command posts.
• Practise movement at squadron and battlegroup-level on radio silence.
• Develop and practise drills for action on command post being acquired.
• Employ alternate power sources to lightweight field generators.

So what, The RE CIS School is working and delivering on the following:

1. Training area permission to dig on Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSI) has been granted of F2 Minley Station for digging-in generators, shell scraps and communication line.
2. Subterranean Command Post (CP), Longmoor Trg Area, utilising the Op INTERFLEX trench complex, the ME DCT 2-1 course are looking at options to rotate through a subterranean CP on their final exercise to simulate a realistic environment.
3. Electromagnetic warfare. (YofS(EW)) from the EW & Cyber wing has delivered a threat brief to the Corps at the Technical Update and course bespoke cascade training delivered by the instructors within the school.
4. Ex COMBINED WARRIOR (Ex CW). Realistic ME DCT trg opportunities, combined arms manoeuvre.
5. Multi-Mode Radio (MMR) the new MMR is a dual-channel radio, enabling simultaneous voice and data communications over alternative networks. It can be used dismounted or mounted in vehicles. MMR can be utilised at point-to-point SATCOM capability to mitigate EW target. An instructor is now the school lead, having completed the MMR T3 training package.
6. Electronic Warfare (EW) Course – The CIS School has nominated instructors from the school to attend the EW awareness course at Blandford to advice ME (DCT) courses and form concept of communication.
7. Investment in HF training (mid-long range HF). Corps wide HF Day (ME (DCT) 2-1 Course), incorporating long range communication using skywave to mitigate detection.

Summary
ME (DCT) must be at the forefront of Corps activity whilst enriching the ME (DCT) trade by providing relevant training, this brief highlights the benefits of holding a Technical Update and the value gained when sharing information across the Corps. C2 is not solely a J6 subject matter expert responsibility, it is a command-led activity, relevant to all levels of tactical command.

• [1] The British Army Review.
• [2] https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2023/06/commander-field-army-preparing-for-war-is-the-best-way-of-securing-peace/
• [3] Command Post Survivability; Doctrine Note 20/03 (mil.uk)
• [4] https://www.l3harris.com/newsroom/editorial/2023/01/uk-mod-adopts-cutting-edge-l3harris-tactical-radios-multi-mode-radio
  

  

  MOD PEI Lecture available below

  
  

  Key Speakers

  

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  Robotics and Autonomous Systems Through the lenses of People, Data and Technology. Swinton Barracks, Tidworth – 25/11/2021 Members Only – View the full video.
  Future Force Development			Future Capability Group
  Defence is experimenting with Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) to develop and understand the capability The RE is in a unique position to utilise off the shelf technologies and the skills of its personnel to inform this experimentation Need ways of exploiting RE skills and expertise in the procurement process for robotics across Defence Lines of Development (DLODs)
  The more accurate the Intelligence and preparation of the environment, the more effectively robotic systems will be able to operate autonomously Recce, Recce, Recce

  Proceedings from the Institution of Royal Engineers Study Day: Robotics and Autonomous Systems and what they mean for the Royal Engineers? The following series of papers record the discussions that took place as part of the Institution of Royal Engineers Study Day at Perham Down on 24 November 2022. The authors volunteered to write up their findings and present them to institution. There were three teams looking at the problems through the lenses of: People, Data and Technology. This follows John Boyd’s philosophy of: People, Data, Technology in decreasing importance. At its peak there were some 200 attendees both physical and virtual. This represented a spread from industry to academia and from Brigadier to Sapper. Speakers represented Army, DE&S and Industry. There was also a display of vehicles ranging in size from a 40t Terrier to a 10kg dive ROV. The observations below form the capstone of the findings from all who participated during the day, further details can be found in the essays written by the SNCOs/Warrant Officers and Officers that gave up their time to lead each syndicate.
  Key Observations – People	Safe and reliable systems are founded on skilled individuals who can understand and operate them. Considering RAS the RE should look to develop digitally skilled humans as the foundation block to operate such systems. This means a change in our values to focus on digital skills, for example the use of e-gaming away from traditional physical sports is one such example. Some form of professional credit should be given to individuals who develop skills in this area. Our current trade streams are likely to be challenged by the advent of RAS. We should look at where new skills are required and not be afraid to adjust accordingly. The need for better quality data about the physical environment is likely to lead to an increased demand for individuals with these skills. This could be a combination of skills from different trades, for example the management, transmission and manipulation of data sets could come from a combination of Digital Communications Technicians, Design Draughtsmen and Geographic Technicians. Members – Read the full article here.
  Key observations – Data	There is an increasing amount of data being collected about the physical environment. This can be used for all sorts of purposes on the battlefield, most notably to accurately navigate autonomous systems. In order to exploit the many potential uses, the RE should seek to become masters of the data on the physical environment. This will not only revitalise our ‘understand’ function but also form the basis for enabling the Future Soldier programme. Effective data exploitation would improve planning processes immeasurably, for example in the Battle Group Engineer’s role. Given better tools to understand the ground they would be able to speed up the decision cycle significantly, potentially offering a tactical advantage. There is a lake of data about the built environment already sloshing around, mastering this will likely provide all arms with a significant tactical advantage. Members – Read the full article here.
  Key observations – Technology	RAS offers the opportunity to make some of the dirty, dull and dangerous roles assigned to the Corps either quicker, easier or less dangerous. However, it also offers the chance to do things differently. For example, developing obstacles that can spoof RAS or combining the skills of EOD with Armoured Engineering to develop smarter minefield clearance. The greater the number of interactions between our people and future technology the better. The military employment of RAS is in its infancy, new technology will bring opportunity to do different things that are not even conceived. We should focus on letting our people have these interactions in order to develop them, we can then harness their talent to make these things a reality. Members – Read the full article here.