From The Hellespont to Bluff Cove
Learning from Non-Equipment Bridging of the Past
SERGEANT C D CARR MInstRE
On 18 October 1914, the War Office received a dispatch containing the following:
During the night of the 13th and on the 14th and following days the Field Companies were incessantly at work night and day. Eight pontoon bridges and one foot bridge were thrown across the river [Aisne] under generally very heavy artillery fire, which was incessantly kept up on to most of the crossings after completion. Three of the road bridges, i.e., Venizel, Missy and Vailly, and the railway bridge east of Vailly were temporarily repaired so as to take foot traffic and the Villers Bridge made fit to carry weights up to six tons.
The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) who, after having been driven back to the French lines at Marne, began to advance on the German troops, forcing them to retreat back towards the Aisne. Naturally, as the Germans withdrew, they denied any remaining bridges they encountered (a number had been destroyed by the British during their own retreat) to slow the advancing BEF. Thanks to the efforts of 7 and 9 Field Companies, the advance was able to continue through a combination of equipment bridging (pontoon bridging trains) and non-equipment bridging (NEB). It was during this operation that Lt Martel RE, of 9 Field Company, prepared a timber lattice bridge made of locally sourced timber and requiring such effort that even the CRE of III Corps was physically involved with its construction at one stage. Lt Martel found himself without the bridging trains due, in part, to a number of factors, including limited equipment availability, long supply lines and stretched Sapper resources.

Fast forward over a century to today and the same issues are discussed in 1st STRIKE Bde. Multiple axes, long and overburdened supply lines and excess demand for limited Sapper equipment support and manpower mean that, in order to offer bridging solutions in the future, we may need to look to the past. The aim of this article is to identify lessons that can be learnt from historical NEB and how they can be applied within a STRIKE context. However, the aim is not to identify NEB solutions that could be applied today, given that a horse and cart has a significantly lower MLC than TERRIER or MASTIFF!
Ancient History
One of the earliest examples of military bridging is not necessarily in line with today’s LEADERS concept. In 480 bc, Xerxes was leading a huge Persian army in his quest to conquer Greece, when he encountered a narrow strait of water, called the Hellespont, in what is now modern Turkey. Initial efforts to cross the 1 km wide strait consisted of two separate crossings. One, led by the Egyptians, was made of papyrus ropes while another, made of flax, was headed up by Phoenicians; each involved securing ‘ships of war’ in place to act as pontoons. Both were destroyed in a great storm as soon as they were completed. A less than pleased Xerxes exerted his wrath; beheading his engineers and punishing the sea itself: [Xerxes] was full of wrath, and straightway gave orders that the Hellespont should receive three hundred lashes, and that a pair of [shackles] should be cast into it. Nay, I have even heard it said that he bade the branders take their irons and therewith brand the Hellespont.
A new ‘batch of engineers more determined than their unhappy predecessors’ were, somewhat unsurprisingly, more successful in their efforts to cross the Hellespont. The engineers used both flax and papyrus cables in combination to secure the boats in place. This improved engineering, combined with favourable sea conditions, meant Xerxes vast army was able to continue its advance towards Greece (and their infamous encounter with the Spartans at Thermopylae).
This example serves to highlight the importance of understanding the engineering principles behind any improvised crossing and unity of effort, as the two independent bridging teams used different materials that potentially could have provided better material properties when used together.
A great example of both ingenuity and engineering, during the Napoleonic war, came not from an officer of the Corps but from the lesser known Royal Staff Corps. In 1809, Wellington ordered the demolition of a Roman multi-span masonry arch bridge over the R.Tagus in order to restrict French movement, although ultimately only a single span was destroyed. Three years later Wellington required the reinstatement of the bridge, and tasked Lt Col Sturgeon RSC to repair it. Lt Col Sturgeon designed a suspension bridge that allowed construction to take place safely off site prior to the build (an idea well before its time). Ropes were hurled across the gap and pulled tight, before a prefabricated roll of linked sleepers was rolled onto them and secured. The bridge was capable of supporting artillery and, through his efforts, Lt Col Sturgeon reduced Wellington’s march distance by 250 km. Lt Col Sturgeon demonstrates the requirement for innovation and minimizing the time spent on site, as well as the potential mobility savings that a
well-placed crossing can create.

Lt Col Sturgeon continued to distinguish himself in this area as Wellington pushed into France itself. Wellington’s intent was to blockade Bayonne, requiring a crossing of the River Adour. Bonaparte’s forces occupied much of the narrower upstream areas, meaning a tougher but more secure site was selected downstream. Lt Col Sturgeon, Lt Col Elphinstone RE and Lt Col Burgoyne RE were given responsibility for the crossing. At nearly 300m long and tidal, the crossing would require significant engineering effort and the three officers soon realized conventional pontoons would not be up to the task. A flotilla of large boats was escorted by the Royal Navy to the site to act as more substantial pontoons, while Lt Col Sturgeon employed his previous method of rope-linked sleepers as a road surface to reduce the amount of timber necessary. 18-pounder cannons and capstans secured the anchor lines in place, prompting George Robert Gleig to proclaim that ‘… no economy was exercised in the matter of anchors …’ in his own account of the operation. As a result of the successful bridging of the Adour, Wellington was able to lay siege to both Bayonne and Toulouse in the closing days of the war. Today, we are no strangers to inter-service co-operation but this crossing emphasizes the importance of calling upon other agencies wherever possible, while the important role played by solid and timely logistical planning and support cannot be overlooked. From a technical point of view, anchorage is an often over-looked but crucial element of bridging and appropriate effort should be employed in their design.
First Anglo-Afghan War
As part of the advance into Afghanistan in 1839, a crossing of the fast flowing River Indus was required in Bukker (now part of Pakistan). Capt Thompson RE was tasked with the construction of a 500m dual-span pontoon bridge using local boats. The fast current proved challenging to say the least, with a number of pack animals and stores lost as they became startled during their crossing. At one stage, the bridge gave way completely, resulting in this excerpt from the Asiatic Journal: PS, the bridge of boats has just given way, and several camels have been carried off, no one knows where … Aside from reaffirming the requirement to keep a close eye on your camels when crossing, this example also highlights why it is always worth close consideration of the nature of the intended users. Xerxes’ second crossing of the Hellespont was deliberately high-sided to prevent pack animals from becoming startled by the vast strait. To put this into a modern context, consider the unsteadiness of top-heavy dismounted troops when fully laden when constructing any sort of rope or light suspension bridge.
First World War
FM French’s aforementioned account of the crossing of the Aisne provides a fine example of NEB during this period. Lt Martell demonstrated how to make the most of what was locally available (in his case timber), in order to reduce the logistical burden, which aligns neatly with the problems associated with STRIKE today in transporting large amounts of stores over long distances. 71 Field Company provide another example from the First World War, nearly 5,000 km away in Mesopotamia (modern day Iraq). In February 1917, Gen Sir Frederick Stanley Maude led the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force to successfully recapture Kut from Gen Khalil Pasha’s Turkish forces, before setting his sights on Baghdad. The march on Baghdad began in March 1917 and required the crossing of the River Diyala: Recognising his difficulties along the Diyala, Maude ordered the bulk of his forces to cross to the west bank. The operation was a resounding success. The Turkish forces committed the bulk of their forces to defend against a British feint to the North, leaving a lone Regiment to defend the city. 71 Field Company’s crossing allowed Gen Maude’s forces to take the Turks by surprise and march directly into Baghdad practically unopposed. The Diyala bridge provides a good example of effectively combining rapid improvised crossing and deception to achieve surprise.
In later years equipment bridging would overtake improvised bridging as the primary means of gap crossing, particularly following the successful introduction of the legendary Inglis and Bailey bridges. Some more recent examples of non-equipment bridging can be found from the Falklands and Afghanistan. During Operation Corporate, 9 (Para) Squadron RE rebuilt the bridge between Fitzroy and Bluff Cove, which had been badly damaged by the Argentinians in June 1982, providing another example of using whatever materials are immediately available to complete the task at hand: Materials that would have been used to repair the
bridge had been aboard the Sir Tristam, which, with the Sir Galahad, was attacked by Argentinian aircraft and badly damaged on 8 June, whilst unloading in Fitzroy Creek. The Squadron therefore had to make use of locally salvaged materials, and welded together scrap RSJs to replace the demolished spans.

9 (Para) Squadron RE continued their foray into improvised bridging nearly thirty years later, repairing a bridge in support of 2 PARA in the vicinity of Checkpoint Perkha during Operation Herrick. Stores were air-lifted into the checkpoint and driven by quad bike down the narrow lanes to the site: Firstly the abutments were shored up with pickets and corrugated iron sheeting, then a deck was constructed, consisting of timber baulks held together with a giant iron staple and resting on sandbags.
This example again shows the importance of careful planning and logistical support. Lt McDougall RE, the Troop Commander responsible for the construction of the bridge, summarized the task: This is a classic combat engineer solution – fast from conception to the final product and robust.
Lt McDougall neatly encapsulates many of the lessons learnt from these various bridging operations and brings us full circle from Xerxes in 480 bc to 9 (Para) Squadron RE in 2011. NEB can allow rapid bridging of obstacles, fast from conception but well planned and resourced. Lt Col Sturgeon RSC demonstrated how this can be aided by pre-fabricated components, while 71 Field Company’s crossing of the Diyala illustrates how a well-executed crossing can achieve surprise effectively. Xerxes’ bridging of the Hellespont confirms the importance of incorporating solid engineering principles and material science when designing bridges, while Capt
Thompson’s crossing of the Indus shows why an appreciation of the nature of the end user is key to success. George Robert Gleig’s own account of the crossing of the Adour, and the amount of effort put into the anchorages, confirms Lt McDougall’s assertion that any solution must be robust. Equipment bridging will always provide a faster and more assured gap crossing solution than NEB but is all too often in short supply, when operating at reach. NEB is timeless, and the lessons learnt by our predecessors are as relevant today as they were in their own time.
